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Soviet T-34 advances through the snow V. The Juggernaut Strikes – A Day-by-Day Account

By Wolf Höpper

V.2. 20 November

Return to 19 November...

Alone in his farm hut, sleep alluded General Yeremenko that night. He worried that his part of the attack should be postponed until all German reserves were drawn of to the northern pincer.
Even after long conferences with STAVKA, in which the situation at the northern front was explicitly analysed, he was simply ignored and therefore feared failure in his sector. To make things worse, the weather was as bad as the day before. Thick ice frost, combined with heavy fog, was lying on the steppe. Additionally his assault forces were getting disorganised while forming for the attack. Finally he decided to postpone the beginning of his part of the offensive. STAVKA demanded an explanation immediately. He expressed his reasons in a detailed manner. STAVKA was not pleased, but at least he was able to get them to acknowledge the problems.
German Map of Operation Uranus
At first the weather did not improve, and Yeremenko hesitated to give the signal for the attack. STAVKA was waiting confirmation that the southern armies were attacking. After another call by Moscow, Yeremenko answered that he had information that the weather will clear up in the next few minutes. It was shortly before 1000 hours. Only minutes later, he ordered the preparatory barrage against the Romanians.
The initial shelling lasted for 45 minutes. Following its cessation the ground troops begin their advance. During the night engineers had cleared paths through the minefields. South of Beketovka the 64th and 57th Armies supported the assault of the 13th Mechanized Corps. Forty kilometres to the south the 4th Mechanized and 4th Cavalry Corps of the 51st Army started their offensive.

A German battalion commander, Major Bruno Gebele, the most southern commander of a German unit, contacted his neighbour, Oberst Gross, from the 20th Romanian Infantry Division, and asked for an evaluation of the situation. 
Soviet rockets

He had received reports from his forward positions that masses of Soviet infantry and tanks had assaulted the Romanian lines. He worried about his flanks, since he knew that the neighbouring battalion only had one horse-drawn 3.7 cm anti-tank gun available! The Romanians fought fiercely, despite the fact the majority of their senior and non-commissioned officers fled.

Unlike the northern pincer the rout of the Romanians started earlier in this area. Here Yeremenko led the operations directly.

Despite the smoothness of the initial Soviet assault, the Soviet forces seriously lack supplies. This situation occurred because shipments across the Volga were still very dangerous because of the ice flow. This was really felt on the second day when food rations of the assault forces were already running out. By the third day the 157th Rifle Division didn’t have any meat or bread at all. Yeremenko decided on an improvisation to overcome the shortcomings. All vehicles of the 64th Army, even ambulances, were designated to carry supply for the advancing mechanized forces.

Romanian Cavalry During the southern attack, the Soviets had another advantage. Their positions, especially the artillery, were established and coordinated much earlier than those on the northern sector. This let the artillery hit the Romanian positions with far higher precision. The rifle divisions advanced a lot faster and were not held back like their counterparts in the north.

The VI Romanian Army Corps (1st, 2nd and 18th Infantry Divisions), was almost completely destroyed and the remnants fled in disorder. Only the 20th Infantry Division held its positions. With the collapse of the Romanian positions Hoth’s headquarters was directly threatened.

The Romanian 6th Cavalry Regiment, defending the Abganerovo Station area, was the only unit able to defend itself against the assaulting Soviet tank forces.

During the night of the 19/20 November, parts of the 16. Panzerdivision crossed the bridge at Golubinka with the forward elements being sent to Suchanov. Here the division planned to establish a defensive line and make contact with German units expected to arrive at the southern area of that sector. The columns marched along the frozen Don River where they refuelled at a nearby German airfield. The whole march was very difficult, since the German panzers didn’t have the winter anti-slip track extensions. Many tanks had to be retrieved after they had slipped into bogs and small ravines. Most movement was difficult because of breaking tracks and problems negotiating the small, but steep, hills they encountered.

At 0300 hours the 5th Guards Cavalry Division of 3rd Guards Cavalry Corps was split into two groups and followed two different advance routes. After one group captured Maoirovskiy by 1230 hours, two regiments of the 1st Romanian Cavalry Division attacked them. Sixteen assault guns, of Kampfgruppe Lepper, attacked the southern thrust. Here a classic cavalry battle raged. The Soviet 20th Guards Cavalry Regiment charged against the Romanian cavalry. A bloody fight ensued, after which the Romanians retreated. The Romanians lost 150 dead, 300 prisoners and more than 800 horses. After regrouping the Soviets intended to advance towards Nizhne-Buzinovka.
Soviet Cossack
The 6th Guards Cavalry Division and two subordinated regiments of 32nd Cavalry Division continued to fight for Platonov, where they were able to drive the defenders back from the northern and northeastern parts of the State Farm. In the eastern section of the farm a joint force of Kampfgruppe Lepper and Romanians held. After seeing that the attacks were unsuccessful, the commander of Soviet 21st Army ordered the 76th Rifle Division to attack the farm directly. He also directed the cavalry formations, after leaving some screening forces behind, to continue the advance towards the Axis rear areas around Selivanov.

The defenders recognised the intended encirclement and retreated towards the southeast. The 65th and 85th Cavalry Regiments, of 32nd Cavalry Division, finally captured the State Farm. The Germans left 150 dead and 3 destroyed assault guns behind.

German Grenadier with ski equipment

At 0500 the 5th Tank Army ordered the 21st Cavalry Division to shift to the reserve of the 1st Guards Army. The latter intended to conduct, with the 5th Tank Army, a joint attack against the Gorbatovskiy area.

There the remaining forces of the 7th, 9th and 14th Romanian Infantry Divisions were positioned. The remaining two divisions of the Soviet corps, together with the previously assigned 35th Guards Mortar Regiment, the 586th PVO AA Artillery Regiment, 179th Tank Destroyer Artillery Regiment, and the 511th Tank Flamethrower Battalion advanced through Bolshaya Donshchinka towards Russkaya Sloboda-Petrovka. This operation was coordinated with the 1st Tank Corps.

The 5th Tank Army renewed its offensive efforts attempting to break the enemy lines in their sector and to completely destroy the Romanian 3rd Army. At dawn they attacked in the same areas combining with a simultaneous attack by the neighbouring 21st Army.

On that day the 16. Panzerdivision started to withdraw its units from Stalingrad. They were replaced by a converted construction battalion and formations of the 94. Infanteriedivision. Although the tired and weary soldiers hoped for warm sleeping quarters, they were assembled at Orlovka. At a balka west of Rynok, the I/Panzergrenadier Regiment 79, I/Panzergrenadier Regiment 64, parts of 5th and 10th companies/Panzergrenadier Regiment 64, 11th/Panzergrenadier Regiment 64, Kradschützen Bataillon 16, parts of Artillery Regiment 16 and the remaining forces of Panzer Regiment 2 gathered. Here the weary soldiers received the news that they were not going to rest but were to be committed to another attack: They finally learned of the Soviet breakthrough on the northern flank of 6th Army.

As the morning was dawning, these forces combined into one combat group and marched 60 km west. They were hindered by knee-high snow and a freezing wind blowing over the steppe. Suddenly the forward elements encountered masses of dark points in front of their route. They were Romanians, without weapons, fleeing in panic towards the south. All attempts by the German officers to rally them were unsuccessful.

By this time the 24. Panzerdivision was prepared to participate in the counterattack.

Kampfgruppe Scheele, and the remaining units/vehicles at the maintenance area near Kamenskaya, was put under the command of Panzergrenadier Regiment 21 (Oberst von Below). 

It was intended to withdraw these units and later feed them into the ongoing counterattack. The remaining units of 24. Panzerdivision were designated Kampfgruppe Don and included:

Divisional Staff
Parts of Panzer Nachrichtung Abteilung 86 (signals)
1st company/Kradschützen Abteilung 4 (armored cars)
2 weak Panzer abteilungen under Oberst von Winterfeld (later combined into one battalion)
IV/Panzer Artillerie Regiment 89 (FlaK battalion – 8.8cm AA guns)
Panzerjäger Abteilung 40 (minus 1 platoon, anti-tank battalion)

Soviet cavalry stop to water their horses
Bad weather, road conditions, snow, ice, and thick fog all hinder the quick movement of the attacking units. During the transfer, a new order from 6th Army arrived and redirected them to Suchano – Yerusslanovskiy – Shvorin. The division headquarters were to be moved to Ssuchano.

At 0930 hours the Soviet 4th Cavalry Corps was ordered to advance through its designated breakthrough point and capture Abganerovo. In two march columns the divisions advanced, while the supporting units (one training battalion, four independent tank destroyer battalions and the 149th Tank Destroyer Artillery Regiment) were left behind the 61st Cavalry Division as a reserve. Their advance was held up by the also bogged down 4th Mechanized Corps. The visibility was so bad that many vehicles simply collided with each other throwing the whole advance into turmoil.

German Panzer III The 1st Tank Corps, 8th Cavalry Corps and 8th Motorcycle Regiment assault the positions around Peshanyi. Several not very well coordinated attacks were repulsed by the Romanian 7th Cavalry Division and elements of the German 22. Panzerdivision. Toward evening the defenders abandoned their positions and retreated southwards. After the infantry units of 1st Tank Corps encountered stiff resistance, they change their attack route towards Bolshaya Donshchinka in the hope of achieving a breakthrough. The 8th Cavalry Corps remained to resume the attack the next day. Here the advancing mechanized formations were greatly hindered by the bad road system.

The whole corps was concentrated along only one passable road. This caused many traffic problems and prevented a faster advance.

The 26th Tank Corps, on the other hand, had to clear the region north of Perezalovskiy, since straggling Romanian units put up another defensive perimeter here and the 1st Romanian Armoured Division started to counterattack.

The decisive advance of 5th Tank Army was held up because of the defence of the Romanians, especially around Peshanyi, preventing Soviet mobile formations from exploiting the breakthroughs. On the other hand, the 1st Romanian Armoured Division constantly attacked the Soviet 124th Rifle Division, and prevented this formation from linking up with units of the 21st Army. This prevented a complete breakthrough by the Soviets in the sector of the 3rd Romanian Army.

But Yeremenko faced another problem. His mechanized units were not fully equipped with motorised transport. Therefore the advance in the southern pincer was less ferocious than in the northern sector. The 13th Mechanized Corps was clearly lacking trucks to mobilise its infantry. They had to be partially brought forward on recently captured railway lines directly to the battlefield. Despite this his formations were still advancing. The weak remaining Romanian resistance was broken easily.

When it finally seemed that the mechanised Soviet formations can advance without hindrance, they run into the elite German 29. Infanteriedivision (motorised). General Leyser’s division met Tanashtshishin’s 13th Mechanized Corps 15 km south of Beketovka. Since Hoth didn’t have communications with the Army Group, he decided on his own to use the 29. Infanteriedivision (motorised) to counterattack the Russians.

German Panzer III

Its Panzer Abteilung 129 was over strength and has 55 panzers available.

South of Servlennaya the 29. Infanteriedivision (motorised) attacked with its armoured group at 1230 hours. Hoth was also able to assemble some Romanian units to participate in this attack. As soon as the opposing tank forces meet, a bloody fight ensued. The Germans had surprise on their side, and together with the better trained and more experienced panzer crews, the tank brigade of 13th Mechanized Corps was destroyed. The majority of the 90 corps tanks were destroyed. At this point the fog began to rise and the German panzer commanders spotted a train unloading masses of infantry to the west. Quickly the panzers take the Soviet infantry under fire. Hundreds of high-explosive rounds were fired into the train and wagons. The already unloaded infantry was also shelled. The advance of the whole 13th Mechanized Corps came to a standstill. The commanding German officer, General Leyser, immediately wanted to pursue the retreating enemy and finish him off, but Army Group B ordered them to withdraw and secure the rear area of the 6th Army. Because the Soviets were surprised to encounter that kind of resistance, Leyser’s plan could have worked in disrupting the southern attack. The higher German command, in the author’s opinion, misused that opportunity as the following details will show.

Romanian Panzer IV G The news of the German success against the 13th Mechanized Corps also reached the 4th Tank Corps under General Volski. He therefore halted his advance towards Kalach and threatened to stop any movements at all if he didn’t receive reinforcements. What he didn’t know was that the Germans had withdrawn. So Leyser’s plan might have worked.

At 1500 hours parts of the old main line of resistance were won back, but the positions have to be abandoned again. From the previously smashed Romanian 2nd Infantry Division only 300 soldiers remained with the division.

In the afternoon the remnants of Panzer Regiment 36 (14. Panzerdivision) get their first combat contact with forward elements of the 26th Tank Corps. Despite small local successes, the sounds of combat resulting from the attack of the Soviet 26th Tank Corps on their left flank, indicates that the German forces were already bypassed. The division defended itself to the north, west and south with its panzers and artillery. Infantry forces were not present. During the night the panzers were directed towards Verchnaya-Businovka, where the Soviets were rapidly moving towards Manoyilin. The FlaK battalion, IV/Panzer Artillery Regiment 4, held and secured the withdrawal of the panzers. The 14. Panzerdivision still hoped for the arrival of the promised infantry regiment from the 44. Infanteriedivision. The Flak unit was, despite holding the Soviet tanks at bay, overrun a few hours later by the arriving infantry of 26th Tank Corps. The Flak unit lacked its own infantry support to successfully defend itself. To cut off the 26th Tank Corps, the 14. Panzerdivision intended to use its panzers to take Manoyilin. All available forces of the 14. Panzerdivision were gathered and sent forward to retake the strongly defended Manoyilin. The attackers suffered severe casualties and the force had to retreat. During the retreat the panzers managed to annihilate a cavalry regiment of the 3rd Guards Cavalry Corps.

By this point the situation was not good for the 14. Panzerdivision. The Soviets, instead of taking up the offer to fight, retreat or simply bypass the German tanks. This astounded the German panzer crews and kampfgruppe commanders. This meant the Germans were constantly participating in a kind of cat-and-mouse game, where a cohesive defensive line could not be established. When the Soviets did accept the challenge they suffered serious casualties. During 19 and 20 November, in only two days of combat, the 14. Panzerdivision knocked out 34 T-34 medium tanks and one KV-1 heavy tank.

At 1505 hours, when the destruction of the Romanian 2nd Infantry Division was confirmed by the commander of I/FlaK Regiment 12 at Nariman, the commander of IV Army Corps, General Jaenecke, ordered the raising of a Kampfgruppe at Yagodnyi under Major Pickel.

This group consisted of:

From 297. and 371. Infanterie divisions each one infantry battalion, 1 artillery battery, 1 panzerjäger company
StuG Abteilung 243 (assault gun battalion, less one battery)
FlaK Abteilung 602 (AA battalion)
1 light and 1 heavy battery of I/FlaK Regiment 12
4th/Artillery Regiment 59 (1 battery of heavy howitzers)
1 battery from II/Artillery Regiment 72
Signal troops.

It was intended to employ this combat group during the next morning to regain the lost Romanian main defensive line.

Romanian Artillery Crew (in old Adrian Helmets) working hard to hold back the red tide during the summer.
At 1555 hours the 6th Army headquarters repeated its order to Korück (command staff) to establish a defensive line Erik-Rozkovskiy-Novovasilevskiy and promised reinforcements. By midnight the following units had either arrived or were on the march to these locations:

Feldgend-Alarm-kp (field police alarm company)
AlarmKp Bf Chir (ad-hoc infantry company raised by the commander of the Chir river area)
AlarmKp Kalach (ad-hoc infantry company from Kalach)
AlarmKp Cernyskovskiy (ad-hoc infantry company from the Cernyskovskiy area)
AlarmKp of NaFü 6th Army (ad-hoc infantry company raised by the 6th Army’s signals battalion)
6 tank destroyer troops (pioneers trained in close combat techniques against tanks, raised by the pioneer school at Kalach)
4th/FlaK 38 (4th Company of FlaK regiment 38 with 3 platoons, each 3 guns strong)
3rd/Werkstatt KP 113 (3rd platoon of the maintenance company 113)
Armee-SanKp 2/542 (army medical company)
Pioneer Kolumn 113 (light bridging column – engineers)
InstKp 113 (another maintenance company)
4 light and 1 heavy PaK platoons

Even with these units the frontline was thin: Over a length of 27 km, 600 to 700 men were deployed in small battlegroups, most without heavy weapons. During the upcoming combat, these formations were sacrificed without any real reason.

Soviet Infantry in snow suits Finally at 1800 hours the advance of the 4th Cavalry Corps was resumed and the 61st and 81st Cavalry Divisions moved forward. During the waiting period the combined forces of the 4th Mechanized Corps and 126th Rifle Division had captured Plodovitoye.

Only weak resistance, from remnants of the Romanian 1st Infantry Division was encountered before the advancing 51st Army. Their advance was finally blocked by the Romanian 6th Cavalry Regiment at Abganerovo and Abganerovo Station. To defeat this resistance the 4th Cavalry Corps enveloped this area from north and south. Even with this envelopment the Soviets were not able to throw the Romanians out of these vital positions.

On the breakthrough by 26th Tank Corps, the towns of Novotsaritsinskiy and Perelazovskiy were captured along with the staff of the Romanian II Army Corps. Because of this the German communication lines to all units the corps were lost. The German liaison radio station was also overrun. From that point the whole Romanian II Army Corps was cut off from higher command echelons.

The breakthroughs by the 21st Army also had consequences for the neighbouring German units. The 376. Infanteriedivision, despite repulsing the small assault groups trying to infiltrate the German lines, had to regroup and prepared to take up new positions to keep contact with the German units acting south of it. The 44. Infanteriedivision undertook similar preparations for repositioning and lost large amounts of supplies and equipment in the following chaos of the retreat.

News of the Soviet offensive finally reached the German OKH. The first reaction that was ordered and immediately offered to the Romanian general staff was to send more weapons. When the break down of the Romanian divisions became obvious, the German high command promised to send 242 anti-tank guns and 225 howitzers sometime in the future. A T-34 tank runs over a Panzer II
Later at 2100 hours the 6th Guards Cavalry Division occupied Svenikovskiy, without encountering any resistance.

For the upcoming night 1st Tank Corps was ordered to move towards Bolshaya Donshchinka. Here they ran into the German 22. Panzerdivision, supported by newly reformed and rallied Romanian infantry units. Panzer Regiment 204, under Oberst von Oppeln-Bronikowski, finally engaged the Soviet tank forces and clashed with them in Pests any, 48 km south of Serafimovich.

The division was down to only 20 panzers, but managed, with the support of their anti-tank guns, to knock out 26 Soviet tanks. This unequal battle was broken off by the Germans. The 22. Panzerdivision retreated because their Panzer 38(t) tanks proved worthless against the superior T-34 tanks of the 1st Tank Corps. Their low numbers of tanks didn’t enable them to engage the numerically superior Soviets for long anyway.

Operation Uranus On the southern pincer one small ray of hope remained. At the end of the day the 29. Infanteriedivision (motorised) still had 52 panzers operational. The armoured fist of the division was still ready to punch against the advancing Soviets.

Meanwhile the 1st Tank Corps turned towards Perelazovskiy and Lipovski, where they overran rear area service and supply units. At the day’s end, the corps gathered around Lipovski and refuelled.

At the close of the day the 8th Cavalry Corps fortified their gained positions of the previous day and undertook reconnaissance missions around their perimeter.


Results of the second day:

Although the Romanians defended their positions stubbornly, their rear area and supply units were seldom able to do so.

This was mainly because they either lacked weapons, even basic infantry weapons like rifles, hand grenades and machine guns; or they were simply not trained in their use. Their only hope of survival was to flee. Isolated groups took up arms wherever available and fought the best they could against the superior Soviet forces. Their resistance proved futile in the end, they were simply no match for the Soviet units.

The Romanian staff officers were less energetic. The Soviet 26th Tank Corps captured many important staff papers from command posts. Also the unwillingness of Romanian officers to resist the Soviets when they arrived is well known. Far more troubling was the fact that the Soviet tank forces captured large stocks of Romanian and German fuel which could be used in the Soviet trucks and light tanks (most Soviet medium and heavy tanks were diesel powered). This enabled them to sustain their drive for Kalach.

Attacking Soviet infantrymen Still some hope for re-establishing a front line and preventing a disaster remained. The most important and still functioning Romanian formation were the remnants of V Army Corps, and the remnants of 5 other divisions: the 5th, 6th, 9th, 13th and 14th Infantry Divisions. They were commanded by General Leutnant Mihail Lascar, a highly respected Romanian officer, who set up a well organized and tactically well executed defence with his units. After the fight for Sevastopol he received the German Knights Cross for his outstanding command abilities. The main reason why he didn’t surrender his forces was that he expected the German XXXXVIII Panzer Corps to come to his aid.
This northern pocket of resistance has another effect. The Soviet tank and cavalry units were advancing without properly covering their flanks. They were seriously in danger of being cut off by counterattacks.

Despite the far higher casualties the Soviets were inflicting during the southern pincer of their offensive, the advance here was less successful. The counterattack of one German mechanized division, the 29th, caused great concerns with the opposing commanders. Another factor was the stiff resistance by the 20th Romanian Infantry Division enabling the successful German counterattack. Lastly, the inability of higher-ranking Soviet officers to coordinate difficult operations beyond direct assaults became obvious.

Day Three, 21 November (live on 31 December 2009)...


Last Updated On Wednesday, November 18, 2009 by Wayne at Battlefront